Reflections on Korean history and its impacts on the US–North Korean conflict by Henneka, Andreas
 
ISYP Journal on Science and World Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2006  19-27 
© 2006 Andreas Henneka 
Reflections on Korean history and its 
impacts on the US-North Korean conflict 
Andreas Henneka 
Helmholtzstraße 16, 10587 Berlin, Germany; gistar@zedat.fu-
berlin.de 
 
 
In the author’s view, nothing in the political behavior of Korean policy (North as well as South) 
can be understood without reflecting upon the experience of the Korean Peninsula and its 
people under the policy of the Great Powers. As expressed in the following pages, the author 
is of the opinion, that one of the main reasons of the radicalisation of the US – and North 
Korean – policy is the underestimation of the meaning of Korean history before and after its 
division.  
 
As Richard N. Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations and a former member of 
the White House policy planning staff, stated in a speech concerning US foreign policy ‘[…] 
government officials rarely, if ever, have time to ponder history or look too far ahead’ [1]. 
The present discussion about the events that have taken place in the Korean Peninsula is 
based on a broad agenda, ranging from the process of inter-Korean rapprochement, the 
relationship this region holds to its former occupier Japan, and the conflict about North 
Korea’s nuclear and missile programme. Without underestimating the importance of any of 
these issues, the discussion about the North Korean nuclear problem is the ‘hot spot’ of the 
international community’s attention. As far as many analysts are concerned, the reason for the 
escalation of this conflict is mainly due to the behavior of North Korea itself. On the other 
hand, however, there are numerous indicators that show that US policy towards the Korean 
Peninsula in the past is also responsible for the situation in North Korea that we face today. 
The conflict between the United States and North Korea is primarily focused on two 
issues, namely, the North Korean nuclear programme and the development of ballistic 
missiles. In search for an explanation for the problem, one often encounters the statement that 
a solution can only be found if North Korea is willing to implement significant political and 
economic reforms. Therefore many road maps for North Korea have been worked out, 
describing precise steps for North Korean reforms. In recognition of the common opinion 
that a change in Pyongyang’s policy is necessary, I am of the view that another major point 
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why the US policy towards North Korea has often failed is the lack of understanding of Korean 
history. Under the administration of George W. Bush and its declared policy of regime change,
it became quite more difficult to ease the mistrust between the governments in Washington 
and Pyongyang. 
In the following pages, I will argue that a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue will 
only be possible if the political decisionmakers in the United States are able and – even more – 
willing to understand that this conflict is embedded not only in a North Korean policy of one-
sided brinkmanship, but also in the absence of a broad knowledge of Korean history and its 
meanings for the Korean people by US officials. 
The origins 
As historians and analysts have figured out, the opening of the Korean Peninsula toward the 
world was not a peaceful process but rather a forceful one. In the beginning, it was the 
economic interest of the western powers in this region (e.g. Great Britain, United States, 
France and Germany) and the military rivalry between China, Russia and Japan, which pushed 
Korea into the world community [2]. 
US and Korea diplomatic relations commenced in June 1882 with the signing of a 
commercial treaty between the two nations, which also included a provision to render mutual 
good services in case of aggression by a third state. Don Oberdorfer, author of the book The 
Two Koreas, wrote on this: 
 
In 1882, as a defensive measure against its neighbors, Korea signed a “Treaty of 
Amity and Commerce” with the United States, its first with a Western power, in 
which the United States promised to provide “good offices” in the event of external 
threat. It was reported that the Korean king danced with joy when the first American 
minister to Korea arrived [3]. 
 
The development on the Korean Peninsula during the period surrounding the signing of 
the Treaty of Amity and Commerce was dominated by the struggle of supremacy over the 
region between China, Russia and Japan. It would thus seem that, being under enormous 
pressure from its direct neighbours, the Korean government was eager to find a potential ally 
which could mediate in case of a foreign aggression. 
Matters occurred, however, in a different way. The United States managed a policy to-
wards Korea aimed at securing their interests without getting directly involved in military 
action. In July 1905, during the Japanese-Russian war, the United States and Japan signed the 
so-called Taft-Katsura Agreement. In this secretly signed treaty, the United States assented to 
Japanese dominance in Korea; in return, Japan agreed to the US presence in Hawaii and the 
Philippines [4].  
With regard to its meanings for the Korean peninsula, the Taft-Katsura Agreement stood 
in clear opposition to the treaty signed previously between the United States and Korea. Of 
course, the Korean government was hardly shocked by the US-Japanese contract and made 
huge efforts to reverse it, although without much hope of success.  
A remarkable point in this respect is that the Taft-Katsura Agreement was signed before 
the peace treaty between Russia and Japan (Treaty of Portsmouth), which was signed in August 
1905, one month after the Taft-Katsura Agreement. Furthermore, the drafting of the Treaty of 
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Portsmouth occurred under the scrutiny of President Theodore Roosevelt and was therefore 
strongly influenced by the United States. In 1906 Roosevelt was awarded the Nobel Peace 
Prize for his mediation between Japan and Russia.  
With all due respect to his achievement, Roosevelt must have realised, that the Treaty of 
Portsmouth was completely at the expense of the Korean Peninsula. Bearing the Taft-Katsura 
Agreement in mind, it is therefore hard to characterise the Treaty of Portsmouth as a fair one: 
The future of a sovereign Korea was not mentioned in any way; on the contrary, the destiny of 
Korea was guided by a complex netting of interests, delegating control over Korea to the 
hands of the Japanese.  
After defeating China in 1895 and Russia in 1905, Japan became the major and most 
influential power on the Korean Peninsula. The Treaty of Portsmouth between Japan and 
Russia guaranteed Japan’s interests on the Korean Peninsula and established its role as 
sovereign over the region. With this treaty not only the victory over Russia but also the 
Japanese control over the Korean Peninsula was sealed.  
In historical retrospective, it was not only the United States who enabled Japan to gain full 
power over the Korean Peninsula. Many of the western governments also saw the possibility to 
combine a controlled Japanese colonialism with their own local interests by accepting the 
Japanese dominance on the Korean Peninsula and Manchuria [5]. The implementation of 
double standard contract systems between the parties was very useful. In the fighting of 
potential influence in the region and the protection of own interests, it was the western 
community as a whole who played a major part in strengthening the process of Japanese 
dominance on the Korean Peninsula.  
In his book Korea’s Place in the Sun, Bruce Cumings, an expert in Korean history voices on 
this:  
 
If Japan had a free hand, it also had a helping hand. It is a sad fact, but a fact, that 
almost every Westerner supported Japan’s “modernizing role” in Korea [6]. 
 
In regard to the process of US-Korean relations, the Taft-Katsura Agreement and the 
doubtful role of the United States during the settlement of the Treaty of Portsmouth can be 
interpreted as the cornerstone for Korean reluctance toward the reliability of US foreign policy. 
With the signing of the Taft-Katsura Agreement, the United States and Japan came to a 
gentlemen-agreement that accelerated the loss of Korean sovereignty. This agreement gave 
Japan a free hand over the Korean Peninsula in exchange for American freedom of action in 
Hawaii and the Philippines. As a result of the Treaty of Portsmouth, Korea was under Japanese 
occupation for almost four decades [7].  
Without going into historical details, there was hope for the Korean people to regain their 
full sovereignty towards the end of World War II. In August 1945, Japan was forced to 
surrender after the airdrop of atomic bombs on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki [8]. The 
‘liberation’ of the Korean Peninsula started by Soviet troops from the north and later by 
American troops from the south. The thirty-eighth parallel line became the line of demarcation 
between the two allies. But instead of becoming a free and sovereign country, the Korean 
Peninsula was once again put under pressure. This time, it was the upcoming rivalry between 
the two major world superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States of America, which 
would shape Korea’s history. Don Oberdorfer on this:  
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Thus Korea came to be divided into two “temporary” zones of occupation that, as 
the cold war deepened, became the sites of two antagonistic Korean regimes based 
on diametrically opposed principles and sponsors [9]. 
 
The political infiltration from the two so-called liberators in their sectors and the increas-
ing radicalisation of Korean civil society and its leaders resulted in the division of the Peninsula 
into two sovereign states in 1948. The two Koreas, notably the Republic of Korea (ROK) and 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), started their new life in dependence of 
their military and political protectors, the United States, the Soviet Union, the People’s 
Republic of China and in a atmosphere of the growing tensions between East and West [10]. 
In this respect, the following war between North and South Korea cannot be described 
only as an inter-Korean war. Started in June 1950 by the military aggression from the North 
with the goal to reach reunification by force, it became clear very quickly that the reasons and 
developments of this war would be strongly characterised by the systemic confrontation 
between communism and capitalism. As Bruce Cumings stated, the war originated from 
multiple causes [11]. One of them, and clearly identifiable as a mistake on the part of the 
Americans, was the fact that after the liberation from Japanese occupation the United States 
took over most of the political and administrational structures established by the Japanese [12]. 
Therefore, many Koreans saw the US policy with critical eyes. This fact played a major role in 
North Korean agitation, blaming the United States as the same brand of imperialists as the 
Japanese, justifying the following war as one of liberation from the new imperialists.  
Indications of the systemic confrontation where already noticeable before foreign military 
forces joined the war. The passing of a resolution by the United Nations Security Council on 
June 27th to condemn the North Korean aggression and to support military action to strike 
back was only made possible by the Soviet Union boycott towards the United Nations during 
that time [13]. After the multilateral troops of the United Nations under US leadership had 
pushed back the North Korean forces and entered North Korean territory up to the People’s 
Republic of China’s boarder, the total character of a representative war came out, when China 
joined the war in October 1950 [14]. From this point onwards it was obvious to everybody that 
this war was not only a result of the intra-Korean confrontation but also a consequence of the 
spreading systemic struggle between East and West. 
The progress of the war is not part of this paper but it is important to mention that its 
course was characterised by disastrous military actions in every part of the peninsula. With the 
intervention of the People’s Republic of China, the situation for the United States and its allies 
became increasingly difficult. With support from China, the North Korean troops reversed the 
situation and occupied southern territory again. As known today, the American fear to lose the 
war led to the US government consideration to use nuclear bombs again to prevent a 
communist victory over the whole Korean Peninsula. Those considerations arose particularly 
when communist troops from North Korea and China regained control over Seoul in 
December 1950.  
In this discussion it was not quite clear whether the use of nuclear bombs should be 
provided as limited strikes against the People’s Republic of China to stop their engagement or 
to the Korean Peninsula itself. The literature on these considerations and their circumstances 
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make it quite clear that the participants had no idea about the real consequences of such strikes 
[15].  
Nevertheless there had been taken different actions by the United States to establish the 
capability to use nuclear weapons. Some of them were simulation tests of atomic bombings, 
undertaken by B-29 bombers flying over North Korea, in October 1951. Even if they used 
dummies instead of real nuclear bombs, Bruce Cumings pointed out correctly that  
 
one may imagine the steel nerves required of leaders in Pyongyang, observing a lone 
B-29 simulating the attack lines that had resulted in the devastation of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki just five years earlier, each time unsure whether the bomb was real or a 
dummy [16]. 
 
That finally no nuclear weapons were used was mostly due to the fact that the war front 
was stabilised by the United States and its allies and that the Soviet Union did not enter the 
war.  
Regarding the massive military use of air-bombing by the United States (including the use 
of napalm) it is quite obvious that not only the government in Pyongyang but also the North 
Korean population have no good memories of US foreign policy. Linking the US capability to 
use nuclear weapons in the Korean War and the present debate on the North Korean nuclear 
programme, Michael J. Mazarr stated that:  
 
The United States thus exposed North Korea, during its infancy as a nation, to the 
fearsome power and enormous political value of nuclear weapons. The lesson was 
apparently not lost on North Korea’s leaders, and early U.S. nuclear threats are one 
important thread in the tapestry of the North’s motives for a nuclear program [17]. 
 
The Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs showed to the world that conflicts in the 20th 
century could be decided within seconds [18]. This experience and the possibility that those 
weapons could decide a war again left a deep impression on the North Korean government 
and its population. Furthermore the US foreign policy on the Korean Peninsula made it almost 
unnecessary for Pyongyang to spread the impression of a brutal and arrogant America: the 
behaviour of the United States spoke for itself. Until today, the sorrows of the Korean War 
have a special meaning to the North Korean resentments against the United States. With the 
American considerations about the use of nuclear force during the Korean War, the nuclear 
issue touched ground in this region for the first time.  
The Korean War started with the goal of reunification by military force and ended with 
hundreds of thousand of deaths and a nearly totally devastated peninsula in July 1953. Since 
the end of the Korean War, the development on the Korean Peninsula passed a lot of critical 
situations. In the succeeding years, the ongoing Cold War seemed to make it impossible for the 
two Koreas to start a policy of conciliation and to smooth the way for reunification.  
In February 1972, the then US President Richard Nixon visited the People’s Republic of 
China and announced a new American foreign policy which contained an Sino-American 
alliance against Soviet dominance. This announcement was also described as the Nixon-Shock. 
The governments in Seoul and Tokyo where particularly astonished by this policy change. But 
24 ISYP Journal on Science and World Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2006  
 
 
 
the fact that they hadn’t been informed or consulted at any point before was much more 
offending than the policy change itself and equal to a loss of face [19]. 
As a result of the announcement, and due to their relations to the two parties (the United 
States and the People’s Republic of China) North and South Korea where forced to react. This 
happened in the form of a common manifest between the two Koreas in July 1972. But after a 
short period of great hopes, it became clear that a lasting improvement in the inter-Korean 
relationship could only be achieved through diplomacy of mutual information and consultation 
and not with forced reactions as a result of unilateral political steps by one of the major powers 
in the region. 
While the Republic of Korea became part of the western community and one of the major 
economic powers in the region during the upcoming years, the DPRK seemed to become totally 
isolated with the political changes in the early nineties. The decline of Soviet Union, the 
German reunification, the collapse of former ‘brother-states’ in Eastern-Europe, and the 
reform process in China, left deep uncertainty in North Korea’s leadership. 
Since the detection of the first indigenous North Korean reactor in the early eighties by US 
spy satellites, the attention of the world community has focused on the question of whether 
North Korea is using its nuclear facilities to produce military-grade nuclear material. In a de-
cade where the loss of important economic partnerships and ongoing natural disasters has 
brought Pyongyang into a position where the government was not able to secure the nutrition 
of its own population, it was quite logical that North Korea used the uncertainty of the world 
community about the status of its nuclear programme to broaden its clearance in gaining 
economic support without losing political control over the country.  
One step forward, two steps back 
Although the problem seemed to have been solved in 1994 through the Agreed Framework 
between the United States and North Korea, the situation remains critical. The implementation 
and validity of the Framework was interrupted several times, and since George W. Bush junior 
took power in 2001 all the attempts forged during William Clinton’s administration as well as 
under the sunshine policy of Kim Dae-Jung have evaporated. Disregarding its counter-
productive meanings, the new government in Washington cancelled the existing roundtables 
with Pyongyang, announcing a policy review on North Korea for the next months. 
 The decision to cancel the talks with North Korea was again made without any 
arrangement. In January 2002, under the impression of the 9/11 attacks, George W. Bush 
called North Korea part of an ‘axis of evil,’ that supported terrorists and the spreading of 
weapons of mass destruction. The visit of the American diplomat James Kelly in October 2002 
made the situation boil after he accused North Korea of keeping a secret military nuclear 
programme. When he returned to the United States, Kelly stated that the officials in 
Pyongyang confessed such a programme. Since then, the situation has deteriorated and the six-
party talks between People’s Republic of China, South Korea, North Korea, the United States 
of America, the Russian Federation and Japan, which started in August 2003 as a result of 
North Korea’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, have shown little 
progress. 
Washington made clear that it is not willing to engage with North Korea until Pyongyang’s 
leadership stops its military nuclear programme. In case of new negotiations, the United States 
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would also like to discuss a broader agenda, referring not only to the nuclear issue, but also to 
the North Korean missile programme and some topics of human rights. North Korea, in 
contrast, is not willing to accept preconditions or to discuss different issues as a whole 
diplomatic package. 
Meanings for the moment 
From the North Korean point of view, the role of the United States as an imperialistic 
aggressor on the Korean Peninsula has never changed. With its faults in diplomatic behaviour 
it will be very difficult for the present US administration to re-open a direct channel with North 
Korea. Furthermore, with its policy towards Iraq, it must be clear for Washington that there is 
no reason for North Korea to trust US offers. Some observers have argued that Iraq was 
invaded by the United States only because it was not able to use the threat of nuclear weapons 
and that this provides a motive for North Korea to pursue a military nuclear programme.  
As far as the missile issue is concerned, it is obvious that the monetary aspect is the major 
impulse for the programme. Selling missile technology is one of the few fields of North 
Korean industry that can ensure foreign exchange. It should also be clear that the ballistic 
missiles stationed in North Korea pose a serious threat to South Korea and in a certain way 
also to Japan. Beyond it, the lasting extension of the ballistic missile programme can also lead 
to disorientation in Beijing and Moscow. The question, whether North Korea is able to 
develop long-range ballistic missiles, which could threaten US territory, cannot be answered 
easily. It is fairly uncertain whether the North Koreans can master the difficult process of the 
electronic steering-control mechanisms of those missiles. So if there is in fact a threat to the 
United States, it affects the US soldiers stationed on the Korean Peninsula and Japan but not US 
homeland.  
Unlike the missile issue, the impulses for the North Korean nuclear programme must be 
seen in a different context. Historically, the use of the atomic bomb in World War II most 
certainly impressed the North Korean leadership. The Cold War and its policy of nuclear 
deterrence could also have been a signal for North Korea that the possession of nuclear 
weapons prevents a foreign attack. As long as North Korea seemed to be protected by its allies 
(the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union) there was no urgent need for North 
Korea to start a military nuclear programme of their own. But after the events of the early 
nineties, which led to the collapse of the iron curtain, the need to develop nuclear weapons 
came into the considerations of Pyongyang as a means to ensure its political survival. In 
contrast to the missile programme, the nuclear programme must be understood in its historical 
dimensions and should therefore be seen primarily as a tactical instrument. This follows from a 
general problem related to nuclear technology, namely, that programmes for civil benefits can 
be readily transformed into military projects (the so called problem of ‘dual-use’). In this sense, 
it has for years been difficult to say whether the North Korean nuclear programme contained 
military use. Only inspections by a neutral side or disclosures from the North Korean side are 
cable of answering this question. The secluded policy of North Korea in that respect is well 
known. In September 2004, North Korea said it had turned plutonium from 8,000 spent fuel 
rods into nuclear weapons. 
The invasion of Iraq has surely shown the North Korean leadership that the United States 
are willing to enforce their political ideas even if the purported rationale is not entirely 
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legitimated. The accusation that Iraq was in possession of biological and chemical weapons 
was not true, and to every expert who was informed about the work of the United Nations 
arms-inspectors in Iraq after the second Gulf War in 1991 it was clear before the invasion that 
the Iraqi threat as stated by Washington was not a realistic one but rather an overestimation. 
As a result of the US policy under George W. Bush, there have been no inspections in North 
Korean nuclear facilities since the diplomatic escalations of October 2002. It therefore lies 
within the responsibility of the global community – including the United States – to seek 
political measures which can solve the nuclear issue in North Korea. The historical burden of 
the United States on the Korean Peninsula and the political behavior of the present 
administration in Washington have an enormous impact on the fact that policy towards North 
Korea is failing on a continuous basis.   
Conclusion 
As I have tried to point out, a peaceful solution for the North Korean problem will probably 
not be found by waiting for regime collapse, regime change, or by forcing North Korea to one-
sided reforms. The international community and especially the United States must accept that 
this policy will only lead to a further escalation of the situation and increase the possibility of 
military confrontation. The historical perspective shows that one-sided accusations for the 
situation, no matter in which direction, do not reflect the historical facts. The problem cannot 
be solved without a wide understanding of Korean history in general. For the future, it is 
important for the administration in Washington to realise that dealing with the Korean 
Peninsula in a responsible way means to consider the region’s wider historical dimensions. 
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